The paper analyzes the impact of the phosphate based animal production rights on agricultural land values in the Netherlands. We claim that the existence of mandatory production control program with regional restriction on trading causes a disproportional increase in land prices in the surplus region where the quota is binding relative to the deficit region where the quota is not binding and that the increase in the cost of environmental compliance should generate an eroding effect on the existing gap in land prices. The parameters of an inverse land demand model estimated with panel data support both hypotheses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The agricultural land market in The Netherlands is characterized by significant regional land price differences. In 1996 the average nominal price of agricultural land was 44,300 Dutch Guilders (NLFL) per hectare (US$ 26,213), with regional prices ranging from NLFL 26,500 to NLFL 58,900. A traditional approach to explaining the regional land price differences is to look into location issues. The land price differences due to location are usually explained by either the proximity to markets, which affects prices of inputs and outputs, or by the increased competition from non-agricultural sectors such as urban or industrial development. In The Netherlands, however, neither of these explanations is particularly useful. Given the size of the country (approximately 150 by 200 miles) and well-developed infrastructure, the effect of distances on farm gate prices is quite small. Development pressure also fails to provide a complete explanation of price differentials due to the strict countrywide zoning policy imposed to prevent the loss of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses. In addition, agricultural land conversion into non-agricultural uses has been made unattractive to farmers through prohibitively high taxation of potential financial gains.
In this paper we seek to find an alternative explanation for the observed regional differences in agricultural land price movements. The idea is to analyze the environmental policy regimes and their potential asymmetric impact on the profitability of agricultural enterprises and hence on land values. In 1986 the Dutch government started to regulate animal production through the imposition of phosphate based manure production rights (quota). There are two parts to the quota: land based quota and animals based quota. In the 1986-1994 period the only way to acquire manure production rights was through acquiring land. In 1994 the animals based quota became tradable but under regionally differentiated constraints. Governmental regulatory policies and programs, such as production quotas, could affect asset values, particularly land prices.
Capitalization theory postulates that the value of an asset is equal to the present value of its expected future returns. Temporal and spatial variation in environmental regulation may influence these returns and, hence, land prices.
Several studies have examined the extent to which government payments, mandatory supply programs and other types of government regulation are capitalized into agricultural land values. Using Iowa rental survey data and hedonic pricing technique Herriges et al. (1992) found an asset value for a corn base of approximately $200 per acre. Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne (1992) addressed the capitalization of wheat subsidies and found a strong relationship between subsidies and land values. Barnard et al. (1997) measured an impact of aggregate government payments on cropland values for 20 land resource regions in the U.S. Their estimates indicate a wide spatial variability in the percentage of direct government payments that are capitalized into cropland values. Vantreese et al. (1989) studied the case of burley tobacco quotas and also reviewed most of the older literature in this area dating back to the late 1960s. They found that producers may be subjected to wide swings in the value of their land if the stability of the program becomes doubtful. Even during times when the program was stable, tobacco quota values fluctuated 75% between some years. Schoemaker (1989) analyzed agricultural land values and rents under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and found that the CRP can raise the value of eligible land. The reason for that effect is the asymmetry of information about the land quality between farmers and the government.
Finally, studies testing the accuracy of the capitalization formula in land markets are numerous and the results are mixed (Burt 1986; Falk 1991; Clark et al. 1993 ).
Earlier literature on land prices in the Netherlands recognized the differences in land prices between agricultural land uses but not explicitly between geographical regions. Luijt (1987) explained the differences between grassland prices and cropland prices as well as the large scale conversion of cropland into grassland in the late 1970s by the returns to land in livestock production being substantially higher than that in arable farming. However, those findings do not provide a complete explanation for the regional price differences because starting in the mid-1970s, agricultural land prices in the region with high livestock density were consistently higher than elsewhere in the country regardless of the land use. In fact, the data shows that the highest land prices are observed for land on less productive sandy soils in the eastern and southern part of the country, whereas prices for land on more fertile clay and loam soil are significantly lower. We try to explain this phenomenon by analyzing the development of environmental policies aimed at regulating animal production in the Netherlands over the period 1988-1996 and its impact on agricultural land values.
This study has two specific objectives. First, we test the hypothesis that the regional constraints on quota trading introduce spatial differences in the returns to agricultural production. When this spatial difference is maintained over time, the differences in rents capitalize into farmland values. Second, we analyze the effects of environmental compliance costs on land prices in the context of a regionally restricted quota trading system. It is hypothesized that land values in the centers of animal production decline with higher compliance costs. In contrast, it is expected that land prices increase in other regions. We estimate an inverse land demand model using pooled cross section and time series data covering the 1988-1996 period. The sign and significance of the estimated parameters as well as the forecasting performance of the structural model support both hypotheses.
II. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Since the enactment of the Manure Law on January 1, 1987 (AMVB 1986), Dutch legislation allows a total manure production from all animal sources of up to 125 kg of phosphate (P 2 O 5 ) per hectare of land. Farmers producing more manure in terms of phosphate need additional registered animal based manure production rights.
The system of manure production rights (manure quota) was introduced in two steps: in 1987 for the production of manure from cattle, swine and poultry, and in 1992 for the production of manure from sheep, goats, ducks, foxes, nutria and rabbits. Each farm was ascribed a so called "reference amount" based on the inventory of animals and standards for the manure production for each specific animal category measured in kilograms of P 2 O 5 per year. These animal specific standards (transfer coefficients) were calculated as the difference between phosphate supply (in feed, animals, fertilizer etc.) and phosphate removal (in meat, milk, eggs, animals, etc.). The residual is assumed to represent the phosphate content in manure. For example, the phosphate standard for fattening pigs is 7.4, meaning that one fattening pig will produce 7.4 Kg of P 2 O 5 per year.
The assessments of all land either owned or long term leased (minimal 6 years and officially registered) used for agricultural purposes were made in December of 1986 and again in December of 1991. The difference between the reference amount and the assessed acreage based phosphate rights was used to establish a distinction between manure surplus farms (with manure production in excess of 125 Kg of P 2 O 5 per hectare) and manure deficit farms (with phosphate production below 125 Kg/ha). A deficit farm can still increase animal production on the basis of unused land based manure production rights. For a manure surplus farm such an increase in production capacity is possible with an increase in the reference quantity of manure production rights or through land acquisition.
Period 1987-1993: Trading in land related manure production rights only From 1987 until 1993 the transfer of the manure production rights was severely restricted to prohibit a further exacerbation of the manure problem. The conditions under which transferring the quota was possible are given in the "Relocation Decision" document enacted on May 1, 1987 (AMVB 1987 . It states that the reference quantity is transferable:
• as part of the transfer of a whole farm 1 ;
• with marriage and heritage;
• with annulment of a lease contract for a farm, in which case the lessor was entitled to transfer the reference amount to another farm in his possession.
The limited possibilities for increasing the manure production rights of the farm and hence its production capacity, meant that expansion could have been only realized by means of land acquisitions. However, buying an additional hectare of land would result in a net increase in aggregate (animals plus land) manure production rights only for a deficit farm. For a surplus farm, buying additional land could cause a proportional amount of the existing reference (animals based) quota to "sink" into the land based quota with no net increase in aggregate manure production rights 2 . So in fact, more animal production was possible only by starting a new animal farm or by starting an animal enterprise on a completely non-used land quota, that is by relocating animal production to crop farming regions. Expansion of the existing livestock farms in the Netherlands came to a standstill in the regions where animal production has been traditionally concentrated, i.e., in the South and East of the country. The regulation indirectly caused a freeze of the agricultural structure in those regions hampering the adaptation and investment processes required for solving the national manure problem.
To counteract these limitations a new law regulating transfer of manure production rights was enacted on January 1, 1994 (Haerkens and Walda 1994) .
Period 1994-1997: Relaxed trading in manure production rights
The main element of the new law regulating transfer of manure production rights was that the reference amount (animals based) manure production rights became tradable.
For each farm the reference amount was converted into "manure production rights"
(manure quota) to indicate the change in policy. In contrast to the homogeneous reference amount, manure production rights became highly differentiated with the goal to restrict the trading. This was done in three steps.
First, a farm's total manure quota was officially divided into two parts: a land based part and a non-land based part. The first part amounts to 125 kg of P 2 O 5 times the number of hectares of land on the farm, whereas the non-land based part is calculated as the difference between a farm's reference amount and the land based quota.
Second, a farm's non-land based quota is allocated to specific animal categories reflecting the situation on an individual farm. Using the inventory figures on animals from earlier assessments of the reference amount, each farm's total manure quota was partitioned into animal categories. This was accomplished by using a ranking scheme reflecting the extent to which keeping various categories of animals is truly land related.
Three classes were established: (1) cattle and turkeys, (2) sheep, goats, foxes, nutria and ducks, and (3) pigs and chickens or broilers. In the Netherlands, hog, broiler and other small animal farms are confined animal husbandry operations, whereas cattle farming is more directly land related. The ranking scheme was used to determine which animal category is associated with the non-land (tradable) quota. As seen in the upper portion of Table 1 , the available land quota (125 Kg of P 2 O 5 per hectare) will first cover the manure production from cattle and turkeys and then, if there is some land quota left, it will be assigned to the other two animal categories until the entire land quota is exhausted. The remaining difference between the farm's reference amount and the land-based quota becomes non-land based and hence tradable. As the result of this regulation, most of the tradable quota ended up being allocated to the third animal category (pigs and chickens).
The denomination of the tradable quota is important because trading is restricted across animal species. The quota was made upward compatible in the sense that the third animal category quota can be used for the production of the second and the first category of animals. On the other hand, pigs and chickens can be produced only with the third category quota since using phosphate quota from any other animal category for pigs and chickens is not permissible. The rationale behind this rule was to prevent farmers from using other animal categories quota to further increase swine production which was perceived to be the source of the most serious environmental problems.
Third, the non land-based quota allocated to cattle, turkeys, pigs and chickens (broilers) is differentiated further to account for the improvements in feed conversion in these sectors. For each of these animal categories a "dormant manure production", i.e., the difference between the original reference amount and the actual phosphate production was assessed. This was done for each farm individually. As seen in the lower portion of Table 1 , the dormant part of the quota became non-tradable. There are few other restrictions that inhibits the trading of the production rights. For example, during each transaction a 25% reduction of usable quota occurs. This reduction applies to all animal categories. In addition, the farmer who acquires additional quota has to certify that he has either sufficient land on his own farm to dispose off the total manure for the next two years or has a manure disposal contract with another farm.
Manure quota can still change hands through land transactions (lease or sale) with no reduction in the available quota. However, just as in the earlier period, if additional land is acquired by a surplus farm, the land-based quota that goes with it automatically 'sinks' into the animals based quota (see footnote 3). So, for a surplus farm, the acquisition of more land reduces the tradable part of the quota by increasing the landrelated share and reducing the non land-related share.
Regional differences
Based on the concentration of animals per unit of agricultural land, The
Netherlands is divided into two regions. The manure-surplus region has an average manure production of more than 125 kg of P 2 O 5 /ha and encompasses parts of four provinces: Gelderland and Overijssel in the East and Noord-Brabant and Limburg in the South (see Figure 1 ). In the past, farms in the surplus region were typically small with a mixture of enterprises. Given the farm size, the lack of better alternatives forced farmers in the region to specialize predominantly in confined livestock production with off-farm purchases of virtually all feedstuffs. ( Since the government's main objective was to keep the animal population from increasing in the surplus region, an important element of the system of manure production rights is a set of geographical restrictions on trading. The transfer of quota is allowed within regions and from a surplus region into a deficit region, but prohibited from a deficit region into a surplus region. In addition to phosphate quota, farmers willing to expand animal production in the surplus region must acquire ammonia rights (MANMF 1995) . Trade in ammonia rights is only allowed within a county and hence is even more spatially restricted than trading in phosphate quota. There is no such ammonia regulation in the manure-deficit region. The combined costs of phosphate and ammonia production rights can increase the start-up costs of a new animal production unit in the surplus region by about 20% relative to the deficit region. 3 Therefore, moving existing swine production out of the surplus region or starting a new farm in the deficit region has become an attractive alternative. Despite the fact that the new regulations have significantly eroded the positive agglomeration effect that the hog industry in the surplus region had historically experienced, hog farmers have not left the surplus region en masse. Social and cultural factors (family ties, differences in religion and dialects) are known to limit considerably the mobility of the farming population in the Netherlands considerably, despite the country's small size.
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Significant land price differences between the surplus and the deficit region are a relatively recent phenomenon. Since the introduction of the CAP in 1968, prices of agricultural land in the surplus region were in fact lower or only slightly higher than in the deficit region. With the expansion of livestock production, notably swine and poultry, during the mid-1970s (see Table 2 ) the land price difference gradually increased reaching its highest level in the beginning of 1990s, see Figure 2 . Based on the presented facts, we conjecture that one of the major contributors to the regional land price differences was the introduction the phosphate production quota system in 1987. The restrictions on the free transaction of production rights served as a barrier to entry into the industry in the manure surplus region thus effectively preserving the existence of rents and hence higher land prices.
III. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The impact of mandatory production control programs on land values depends on their net effect on expected farm income and returns to land. The question becomes how big is the increase in land returns over the next best alternative and how long will it last. At the heart of the literature on land values is the asset pricing theory. The simplest version of this theory assumes that land buyers are risk neutral, they discount the future at the constant rate, markets are perfectly competitive, and land is valued only for its economic return. If these assumptions hold, then a precise relationship exists between land values and the income from that land. Asset pricing theory postulates that the value of the land is equal to the discounted present value of its expected future returns. The model explains the variation in land values through differences in land characteristics, which determine, in part, the expected future returns or rent-earning ability of that land.
To model the complicated institutional arrangement of the Dutch phosphate quota system, several simplifying assumptions are required. We will assume the presence of one type of animal production (say swine) which is regulated through a mechanism of mandatory supply control program in the form of phosphate (P 2 O 5 ) based manure production rights (quota). To keep or grow a certain number of pigs (Y), farmer i must possess a manure quota (M) expressed in Kilograms of phosphate (P 2 O 5 ), which consists of an animal-based (A) and a land-based (L) component:
Each hectare of agricultural land carries with it k=125 Kg of P 2 O 5 . In addition, a farmer can own a historically determined animal based quota A i valid for a certain number of animals, with the relationship between animals and phosphate being determined by the animal specific transfer coefficient α (7.4 Kg of P 2 O 5 for each fattening pig per year). The landbased component of the quota is tradable only through land transactions (sales and leasing)
whereas the animal based quota is separately tradable within regions but not between regions.
5 The production technology is described by
where X i represents the farm i's vector of inputs into hog production other than land and L i is the land input. For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, we define one element of the X vector as representing the waste management (abatement) input.
The animal production takes place in two distinct geographical regions, each of them characterized by homogenous producers. In Region 1, the manure-surplus region, the aggregate phosphate quota (land plus non-land) is binding, so that no net-expansion at the regional level can occur. Superior entrepreneurial capacity and agglomeration effect in hog production makes a representative firm in Region 1 a low cost producer. High concentration of the animal production units in the surplus region makes the animal waste disposal increasingly difficult such that an increase in swine production requires more than a proportional increase in the use of waste management input. Consequently, the production technology in equation [2] for the surplus region is characterized by the waste management (abatement) input that is output elastic. In Region 2, the manure-deficit region, the aggregate quota is not binding at the regional level so that the expansion can occur via the availability of the unused land based quota. The representative hog farmer from Region 2 that has been traditionally specialized in crop farming and horticulture is a high cost hog producer. 6 Given the fact that the overall production of animal manure in this region is relatively small, there are ample possibilities for the cost efficient disposal of animal waste.
This situation justifies the specification of the production function in [2] with waste management input being output inelastic.
Land price differences emerges. In the case of a non-binding quota the entire surplus would represent the return for entrepreneurial skills and agglomeration factor, whereas in the presence of a binding quota, the surplus consists of two parts: the return to the ownership of quota (C'D×OM 1 ) and the return to other scarce factors (DB'×OM 1 ). Farm 2, being a high cost producer located in the deficit region, is similar to Farm 1 except that its average costs are so high that there is nothing left as a return to scarce factors. Also, the deficit region is endowed with a phosphate quota level M 2 such that the marginal cost of production at M 2 is greater than the output price. As a result, optimal production occurs at its efficient level Y 2 * where P=MC=AC, the quota is non-binding and the quota lease rate is zero.
The situation exemplified in Figure 3 represents a long-run equilibrium and the monetary surplus received by Farm 1 can be described as a rent. The fact that Farm 1 earns rents is no threat to the equilibrium stability as long as there are no potential producers that are in a position to take that rent away. More precisely, the stability of the existing equilibrium is guaranteed by the scarcity of the entrepreneurial skills in hog production, the restrictions on the transferability of the animal based quota and the immobility of the land.
The rents are sustainable as long as there are no hog producers currently not in business that can enter the surplus region and potentially produce with minimum average costs below OP * (Friedman 1976, 124) . The difference in quota rental rates can persist if the quota cannot be transferred between the two regions (Rucker et al. 1995) .
To gain additional insights into the nature of problem, we now turn explicitly to the model used to derive cost curves for a wealth-maximizing firm:
Minimize:
subject to:
where C i is the individual producer's cost function and Y i 0 is a parametric value of output.
The producer is a price taker and considers factor prices, w X and w L, , and the animal based quota rental rate, r, as exogenous. Assuming the existence of an interior solution, the optimal choice of decision variables may be characterized by the first order conditions:
where λ i is the Lagrange multiplier for the technology constraint [3a] and µ i is the Lagrange multiplier for the phosphate quota constraint [3b] . When the quota constraint is binding, µ i >0, the equilibrium quota rental rate equals the shadow price of the quota constraint (r=µ i ) and the per hectare price of land equals the sum of the marginal productivity of land valued at its shadow cost and the quota rental price per hectare
When the quota constraint is not binding, µ i =0, the equilibrium price of land equals simply the marginal productivity of land valued at its shadow price. Notice that both the land price and the quota rental rate are established at the product (hogs) market. The location of the market demand curve for hogs determines how much land can be profitably employed in the hog production and how much income in the form of rent will be generated.
Assuming that the production function is sufficiently well behaved so that the second order conditions for a constraint minimum are satisfied, the solution of the first order conditions yields factor demand curves for L, X and A, as well as the indirect cost function
[10]
The use of the envelope theorem gives the expression for the marginal cost
The marginal cost consists of two additive parts, the first representing the production technology driven component and the second the quota (permits) based component of the marginal cost. This breakdown is also visible on the far left panel of Figure 3 . At the production level Y 1 =M 1 , the following equalities hold: P * =λ 1 +αr = M 1 D+DC'. 8 Of course, the breakdown of the marginal cost curve into technology part and the quota part is only conceptual. Rents earned by the surplus region farmers should be treated as implicit costs,
because this is what somebody else would end up paying for the opportunity to grow hogs in that region. In other words, the marginal cost curves of hog producers in the surplus region have an element of implicit quota rental cost.
Following capital asset pricing to land value formation, we can derive a straightforward implication of the described two-region model on land prices. In estimating the wealth of a farmer located in the surplus region, the rent due to the scarce entrepreneurial experience is portable to the degree of entrepreneurs' interregional mobility whereas rents due to the agglomeration factor and production quota will be capitalized in the value of the land. The empirical evidence seems to be pointing towards persistently larger net returns to land in livestock production than in arable farming (Luijt 1987) thus explaining the early origins of land price differences between regions. However, the widening of the gap coincides with the introduction of environmental policies aimed at regulating the livestock production, notably the manure production quota. The regional restrictions on trading caused a disproportional increase in the price of agricultural land in the surplus region where the quota is binding relative to the deficit region where the quota is not binding.
An increase in cost of environmental compliance
With newly introduced regulation on ammonia emissions and increasing difficulties with the disposal of animal waste, the costs of environmental compliance for Dutch hog producers went sharply up during the 1990s. The question being asked here is how did this increase impact the land prices in two regions. Formally, we represent the increase in the cost of environmental compliance as an increase in the price of the waste management factor w X . The originally posed question can be answered by analyzing the shift in the output level Y 0 * associated with a minimum average cost change when a factor price increases. The output effects of changing factor prices on firms in long-run competitive equilibrium can be determined from the following relationship (Silberberg 1978, 211) :
Two results can be obtained depending on the whether the producer is a surplus or a deficit region farm. The outcomes are described in Figure 4 .
The increase in price of waste management input will always cause the average cost curve to shift up and, if waste management input is a non-inferior input, will also cause the marginal cost curve to increase. If the waste management input is output elastic, i.e.
, as it is the case in the production function representative of the manure-surplus region, the average cost curve will increase but the marginal cost curve will shift up even more and so all firms will end up produce less output. The situation is illustrated in the top panel of Figure 4 . The decrease in production is going to relax the phosphate constraint, reduce the quota rental rate and according to expression [9] , cause the land prices to drop. If the waste management input is output inelastic, i.e., 1 0
, as it is in the production function representative of the manure-deficit region, the MC curve will shift up by less than the AC curve and will intersect the new (raised) average cost curve at the higher output level than the old minimum AC point. This situation is illustrated in the bottom part of Figure 4 .
The increased production in the region will have an enforcing effect on the phosphate constraint causing the land prices to increase.
Notice that, in actuality, the animal based quota can be transferred from the surplus region into the deficit region. However, as noticed by Van Bruchem and Terluin (1994) , the differences in quota rentals imply that these kinds of transactions would never occur. The manure production rights needed to expand the swine production in the deficit region will come entirely from the land-based quota causing the land prices to go up. This leads us to the second testable hypothesis of this paper. The increase in the cost of environmental compliance that hit the Dutch hog producers in the mid-1990s generated an eroding effect on the existing gap in the land rents and consequently land prices between regions.
IV. ESTIMATION
The price of land and the acreage transferred are usually treated as endogenous variables in the demand-supply model of the land market. In the context of this analysis, however, the supply side is ignored by assuming that land supply is more or less price inelastic, mainly dependent on demographic factors. Earlier investigations of the Dutch land market (Luijt 1983) provided some evidence for this assumption. Thus, the land market is jointly cleared by the exogenous supply of land and the previously obtained factor demand for land. This assumption enables us to estimate the reduced form inverse land demand model of the following form:
In the period 1987-1993 the quota was not tradable separately from land, so quota rental rates were not observable independent from land prices. After the trading constraint was relaxed and animal based quota became independently tradable, markets remained relatively thin and there were not enough observations to construct the required data series.
Instead, from [9], the quota rental rate was expressed as the difference between the land price and the marginal value product of land. This approach was used to estimate a modified version of [13] in which the land price becomes a function of the land acreage, marginal value product of land, the level of output, and input factor prices.
The expected sign of the land acreage variable is negative reflecting the negative price-quantity relationship. Next, following Luijt (1987) , the marginal value product of land was approximated using farm income. This approach is justified on the conjecture that, ceteris paribus, we should observe higher farm income where land is more productive. The expected sign of the income variable is clearly positive. The level of output was approximated by the total amount of manure produced by all animals in the region. The expected sign of this variable is positive reflecting the gap in land prices between manure surplus and manure deficit region. Finally, the land price equation was estimated using two factor prices: the price of waste management input and the price of capital. The price of the waste management input was approximated with the cost of environmental compliance. We expect the sign of the environmental compliance cost coefficient to be negative in the surplus region and positive in the deficit region reflecting the hypothesized narrowing of the gap in land prices between regions. The price of capital was measured by the average annual mortgage rate used by agricultural banks. The expected sign of the mortgage rate variable is negative. The increase in the interest rates that agricultural lenders charge their clients would decrease the demand for land and depress prices. The estimated equation has the following specification: where the dependent variable w Lit denotes the land price in province i and year t, L it is land acreage, FI it is farm income, P205 it measures the provincial total manure production, SRDEC it is the cost of environmental compliance multiplied by the surplus region dummy, DRDEC it is the cost of environmental compliance multiplied by the deficit region dummy, MR it denoted the mortgage rate, SRD it is a surplus region intercept dummy variable and ε it is a stochastic error term.
The empirical analysis was carried out using panel data consisting of 9 years time series (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) and 9 provinces cross-section for the total of 81 observations. The remaining three provinces (Flevoland, Utrecht and Limburg) were dropped due to the lack of comparable data. Due to data lumpiness, the regions were defined using provinces in their entirety such that three provinces (Gelderland, Overijssel and NoordBrabant) form the manure-surplus region and the remaining six the manure deficit region.
The variable total agricultural land includes the total acreage of grassland and cropland by province (CBS-a, various years). Annual data on land prices are weighted (by acreage sold) average prices paid for cropland and grassland by province (CBS-b, various years).
The total manure production was calculated by multiplying the number of animals by the coefficients that convert animal numbers (CBS-a, various years) into kilograms of phosphate. The annual farm income data was constructed because the classification used in the regular statistics (LEI-DLO-a, various years) does not parallel the administrative distinction by provinces used in the estimation. The classification in the regular farm income statistics is based on farm types and sizes by agronomic conditions. For the nine provinces included in the estimation the composition of the farms by type, size and agronomic conditions in a given province was constructed from the sample design justification of the income statistics (LEI-DLO, 1995, 16-17) . Given the fact that the relationship between farm income and land prices is likely not contemporaneous, the income variable was constructed as a 3-year moving average lagged one period. are converted into constant 1990 Guilders using the purchasing power index.
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The estimation was carried out by employing a set of assumptions on the disturbance covariance matrix that gives a cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise first-order autoregressive model (Parks 1967) :
Since the number of time series observations in our data set is relatively small (T=9), we estimated the autoregressive parameters ρ i as the sample correlation coefficients between e i,t and e t,t-1 thus insuring their values within the [-1, +1] interval (Kmenta 1986, eq. 12.26). The model was estimated using the GLS estimation procedure and the results are presented in Table 3 10 . All explanatory variables have the expected signs and significant at 1% significance level.
From the perspective of hypotheses testing, the critical variables in the model are the phosphate production and the cost of environmental compliance. The hypothesized differential impact of binding quota constraint on land prices in two regions is confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient on phosphate variable indicating higher land prices associated with higher animal production. The fact that land prices are higher in the surplus region is also captured by the positive and significant surplus region dummy variable. The rationale for including a surplus region dummy variable in the inverse land demand model has to do with the existence of other factors contributing to land price differences which were in effect prior to the introduction of manure quota system which we discussed earlier.
The hypothesis about narrowing of the gap between regional land prices is tested by a pair of interaction variables. These were constructed by multiplying the regional dummy variables by the cost of environmental compliance. The increase in the cost of environmental compliance impacted the land prices in two regions differently. The sign of the interaction term between the environmental compliance cost and the surplus region dummy is negative and the sign of the interaction term between the environmental cost and the deficit region dummy is positive. The increase in environmental compliance cost causes the land prices in the surplus region to decrease and in the deficit region to increase thus narrowing the existing gap.
Based on the estimates from Table 3 , the difference in the predicted land prices between the surplus and the deficit region can be calculated. Since our goal is not to accurately forecast land prices but only to explain the observed phenomena, it is sufficient to generate predictions based on the structural part of the model only. The predicted land price differences are calculated as:
where X confidence intervals are presented in Table 4 . The fact that upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval based on the structural part of the model do not cross supports both of the stated hypotheses.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Mandatory supply control programs such as production quotas affect asset values, particularly land prices. Capitalization theory postulates the value of any asset is equal to the present value of its expected future returns. Temporal and spatial variation in environmental regulation may influence these returns and, hence, land prices. The objective of this paper is to analyze the development of environmental policy for intensive animal production in the Netherlands over the period 1988-1996 and its impact on agricultural land values.
Based on the long-run equilibrium model, two testable hypotheses were derived.
First, the existence of mandatory production control program with regional restrictions on trading should have caused a disproportional increase in price of agricultural land in the surplus region where the quota is binding relative to the deficit region where the quota is not binding. Second, the increase in the cost of environmental compliance should have generated an eroding effect on the existing gap in the land prices between regions. The sign and the significance of the estimated parameters as well as the forecasting performance of the structural model support both hypotheses.
In its early stages of implementation, the program served as a barrier to entry into the swine industry in the manure surplus region. By restricting the free transaction of production rights it effectively preserved the existence of rents and hence higher land prices. In the later phase, an upward shift in environmental costs acted as a stimulus for producers in the surplus region to move their production into the deficit region. Due to the higher quota prices in the surplus region, it was more profitable to leave (sell) the quota in the surplus region and to buy land in the deficit region. Therefore, the manure production rights needed to expand the swine production in the deficit region appear to be 
Endnotes:
1 Under two important restrictions: the amount could only be bought and sold in its totality and the farm had to be continued as an autonomous enterprise at the same location as before.
2 As an example, consider a 3-hectare farm with 1,000 fattening pigs. As mentioned before, the animal specific transfer coefficient for pigs is 7.4 Kg of P 2 O 5 per animal per year. Therefore, this farm's total reference amount is 7,400 Kg of phosphate per year.
Given that the land based phosphate allowance is 125 Kg of P 2 O 5 per hectare, the total reference amount is composed of 3 × 125 = 375 Kg of land based quota and 7,400 -375 = 7,025 Kg of animals based quota. Buying 1 hectare of additional land, would increase the land based quota to 500 Kg but would at the same time decrease the animal based quota to 6,900 Kg without changing the total available quota. Consequently, this farm would have to buy additional 55.2 acres (55.2 × 125 = 6,900) of land before its total quota available for production would go up. 3 The investment costs for a new swine finishing facility in 1995 required about NLFL1,155 per pig placed (GIBO 1996) . In addition, starting a new operation in the surplus region would require purchasing 7.4 Kg of phosphate quota and 2.5 Kg of ammonia quota per pig placed. Using 1995 quota prices of 25 guilders per Kg of phosphate quota and 25 guilders per Kg of ammonia quota translates into an additional expense of about NLFL 250 per pig placed. 4 Research on this topic has particularly focused on glasshouse horticulture, see for example Voskuilen and Van Elk (1990) . 5 As a matter of fact, the phosphate quota trading rules allow the quota to be traded from a surplus region into a deficit region but not the other way around. However, as we will show shortly, the stated assumption is not restrictive at all. The direction of quota transactions that we ruled out, given the existing differences in quota allocations and marginal costs of production, would have never happened anyway. 6 Notice the difference with the regional characteristics of the swine industry in the United States. Traditional hog producing regions, such as Iowa, have been dominated by small family farm operations who grew hogs of diverse genetic stock and with relatively low feed conversion efficiency. In contrast, non-traditional hog producing regions such as North Carolina are dominated by vertically integrated companies who produce hogs in large and highly efficient production units by means of contracting the grow-out with independent farmers (for details see Zering 1998).
7 Notice that M (in Kg of phosphate) and Y (in number of pigs) share the same axis because they measure the same quantity in different units. The number of pigs can be converted into kilograms of phosphate by multiplying it by the transfer coefficient α.
8 Notice the difference in units between expression (9) and (11). The price of land is expressed in guilders per hectare of land, whereas the marginal cost is expressed in guilders per animal, α being the animal specific transfer coefficient between number of animals and kilograms of phosphate. 9 The entire data set is available from the authors upon request. 10 The POOL command in SHAZAM provides features for estimating this model and some variations of it. 
